Case Roundup

In re CZ Liquidation Corp. (1st Cir. BAP 2005)

Rule 9011 sanctions warranted by argument of a party in interest that DIP and committee professionals should disgorge ther fees because they were creditors of the estate (thus not "disinterested") on account of their fee claims.

_______________________

In re Barber (10th Cir. BAP 2005)

No requirement to itemize damages in Adversary Complaint under §523(a)(2) that only seeks a determination as to dischargeability.

_______________________

In re Tama Beef Packaging, Inc. (8th Cir. BAP 2005)

An unsuccessful bidder who establishes a right to a substantial contribution claim under section §503(b)(1) for increasing the purchase price of an estate asset through participation in an auction of that property is not entitled to a break-up fee (i.e. a percentage of the purchase price), but rather to reimbursement of its Attorneys Fees.

__________________________

In re Northwestern Corp. (Bankr. DE 2005)

Where a post-confirmation settlement would upset expectations under a confirmed Plan, the settlement cannot be approved absent the consent of the affected classes of creditors.

_________________________

In re US Interactive, Inc. (Bankr. DE 2005)

Where a few pre-petition transactions between a debtor and a preference defendant are found to exist, the ordinary course of business in the industry plays a more prominent role in an "ordinary course defense" analysis than the business between the parties themselves. The defendant must establish an industry standard by proof of an agreed practice and manner of payment among the debtor's competitors. Where the pre-petition relationship between the debtor and defendant was short, adherence to a bright line industry standard is required, but the longer the term of the relationship the more latitude is recognized in industry terms. Generalized evidence of an industry standard is not sufficient. The evidence must be objective, definitive and supported by specific data.

___________________________

In re Urban Broadcasting Corporation (4th Cir. 2005)

To have standing to appeal, the appellant must be a "person aggrieved" by the bankruptcy order. A person aggrieved is "a party directly and adversely affected pecuniarily." Defining standing by whether a party waives or forfeits rights misconstrues the standing requirement. Defining standing by whether an appellant has objected to an order or attended a hearing conflates basic notions of standing with notions of waiver and forfeiture.